Terminal
Terminal/Skill
Checks a live domain's DMARC, SPF, DKIM, BIMI and MX records and gives a prioritized fix plan for spam or spoofing problems.
By Bird
Works with
npx skills add messagebird/bird-ai --skill email-auditbird email tools audit <domain> resolves a domain's live email-authentication records — DMARC, SPF, DKIM, BIMI, MX — validates each, checks how they work together, and returns a graded report. Your job with this skill is to run it and then act as the consultant: read the findings, explain what each means in plain terms, and give the user a prioritized plan.
It is DNS-only and needs no auth. It sends no mail and inspects no message; it reads what the domain publishes.
bird email tools audit acme.com
bird email tools audit acme.com --selector s1 # also check a DKIM selector (see DKIM below)
MCP: email_tools_audit with { "domain": "acme.com", "selector": "s1" }.
audit <domain> — "how is my domain set up?" Resolves live records and grades the whole posture. This is the one to reach for when someone describes a symptom ("going to spam", "failing DMARC", "can people spoof us?").validate-dmarc / validate-bimi <record> — "is this record I wrote correct?" Offline, parses a pasted string. Use when drafting a record before publishing, not when diagnosing a live domain.If they give you a domain, audit it. If they paste a record, validate it.
{
"domain": "acme.com",
"valid": false, // true only when there are NO problem-severity findings
"records": [ // what was found, per area
{ "area": "dmarc", "found": true, "value": "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=..." },
{ "area": "spf", "found": true, "value": "v=spf1 include:... ~all" },
{ "area": "dkim", "found": false, "value": null },
...
],
"findings": [ // graded observations, most-severe first
{ "severity": "problem", "area": "spf", "message": "...", "fix": "..." },
{ "severity": "warning", "area": "dmarc", "message": "...", "fix": "..." }
],
"recommendations": [ "...", "..." ] // the fixes, problems first — the action list
}
Three severities, and what each means for the user:
problem — delivery or spoofing protection is actually broken right now. Lead with these. (valid is false whenever any exist.)warning — works, but is weak, incomplete, or risky. Address after the problems.ok — a passing check. Use these to reassure ("DMARC is enforcing, good") so the report isn't only negatives.The fastest way to advise: read findings top-to-bottom (already severity-ordered), then hand back recommendations as the to-do list. Don't just dump the JSON — translate it.
DMARC (_dmarc.<domain>) — the policy that ties SPF and DKIM together and tells receivers what to do with mail that fails. The journey is p=none → p=quarantine → p=reject:
p=none is monitor-only: you get reports but spoofed mail still lands. It's the right first step, never the destination. Recommend moving to quarantine then reject once legitimate mail is passing aligned (see Alignment).problem — the domain is spoofable and you're blind to abuse. Start at p=none with a rua= address to collect reports.rua= means no visibility — add a reporting address before tightening the policy.SPF (<domain> TXT, v=spf1 …) — the list of servers allowed to send for the domain. Two things bite people:
include:, redirect=, a, mx, ptr, exists costs a DNS lookup, and include: chains recurse. Over 10 total, SPF returns permerror and fails for all mail, including legitimate. The audit counts recursively — this is its main value over eyeballing the record. The fix is to flatten or drop includes (remove unused providers, or use a sender that auto-flattens).all qualifier. -all (hard fail) is the goal; ~all (soft fail) is fine while verifying; ?all (neutral) and especially +all give no protection — +all lets anyone send as the domain. Move toward -all once every legitimate sender is listed.problem (permerror) — merge into one.DKIM (<selector>._domainkey.<domain>) — a cryptographic signature on each message; the more durable half of DMARC because, unlike SPF, it survives forwarding. The catch: selectors can't be discovered from DNS. The audit can only check DKIM if you pass --selector. So:
--selector <s>.problem for mail signed with it — publish the provider's public key, or correct the selector.BIMI (default._bimi.<domain>) — optional; shows the brand's logo in supporting inboxes. It only displays once DMARC is at enforcement and (for Gmail/Apple Mail) a Verified Mark Certificate (a=) is published. Absence is not a problem — it's a "nice to have, and only after the basics." Don't recommend BIMI until DMARC is enforcing.
MX (<domain> MX) — where the domain receives mail. No MX is only a warning: it's fine and common for a send-only domain, but worth confirming it's intentional.
DMARC passes only when SPF or DKIM passes and is aligned with the From: domain. So the audit's most important synthesized finding is: is DMARC enforcing while neither SPF nor DKIM can produce an aligned pass? If so, the domain's own legitimate mail is being quarantined or rejected — the most damaging misconfiguration, and the one to fix first. Conversely, you can't safely advance DMARC past p=none until at least one of SPF/DKIM aligns. When you advise on sequencing, this is the spine: get one of SPF/DKIM aligned → raise DMARC to quarantine → reject → (optionally) BIMI.
bird email tools analyze-headers; to read a DMARC aggregate report, analyze-dmarc-report.)Be the consultant, not a linter:
recommendations.ok findings so they know what's already right.